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2Respecting All The Evidence
Abstract: Plausibly, you should believe what your total evidence supports. But cases of 
misleading higher-order evidence -- evidence about what your evidence supports -- present a 
challenge to this thought. In such cases, taking both first-order and higher-order evidence at 
face value leads to a seemingly irrational incoherence between one’s first-order and higher-
order attitudes: you will believe P, but also believe that your evidence doesn’t support P. To 
avoid sanctioning tension between epistemic levels, some authors have abandoned the 
thought that both first-order and higher-order evidence have rational bearing. This sacrifice is 
both costly and unnecessary.
We propose a principle, Evidential Calibration, which requires rational agents to 
accommodate first-order evidence correctly, while allowing rational uncertainty about what to 
believe. At the same time, it rules out irrational tensions between epistemic levels. We show 
that while there are serious problems for some views on which we can rationally believe, “P, 
but my evidence doesn’t support P”, Evidential Calibration avoids these problems. An 
important upshot of our discussion is a new way to think about the relationship between 
epistemic levels: why first-order and higher-order attitudes should generally be aligned, and 
why it is sometimes – though not always – problematic when they diverge.
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1. Three desiderata for an account of higher-order evidence
Consider the following story:
Calculation: Anton is an anesthesiologist, trying to determine which dosage of 
pain medication is best for his patient: A or B. To figure this out, Anton assesses some 
fairly complex medical evidence. When evaluated correctly, this kind of evidence 
determines which dose is right for the patient. After thinking hard about the evidence, 
Anton becomes highly confident that dose B is right. In fact, Anton has reasoned 
correctly; his evidence strongly supports that B is the correct dose.
Then Sam, the chef at the hospital’s cafeteria, rushes in. “Don’t administer that 
drug just yet,” he says guiltily. “You’re not in a position to properly assess that 
medical evidence. I slipped some reason-distorting mushrooms into your frittata 
earlier as a prank. These mushrooms make you much less reliable at determining 
which dose the evidence supports: in the circumstances you presently face -- 
evaluating this type of medical evidence, under the influence of my mushrooms -- 
doctors like you only tend to prescribe the right dose 60% of the time!” In fact, Sam is 
mistaken: the mushrooms he used were just regular dried porcini, and Anton’s 
reasoning is not impaired in the least. But neither he nor Anton knows (nor has reason 
to suspect) this.
3Suppose Anton justifiably believes that Sam has given him the mushrooms. How should 
Anton accommodate his evidence about which dose of medication to give to his patient? And 
how should he accommodate Sam’s testimony?
Plausibly, Anton should believe what his evidence supports. Recent work in 
epistemology commonly divides evidence like Anton’s into two categories: “first-order” and 
“higher-order”. Anton’s first-order evidence, which bears directly on the question of which 
dose is right for his patient, consists of facts about the patient: his weight, age, etc. His 
higher-order evidence -- Sam’s testimony -- bears directly on the reliability of Anton’s 
reasoning. Intuitively, Anton’s final doxastic state should reflect both kinds of evidence. This 
suggests the following two desiderata for a plausible account of what Anton should believe:
Desideratum 1: One’s rational beliefs should reflect the bearing of one’s first-order 
evidence.
Desideratum 2: One’s rational beliefs should reflect the bearing of one’s higher-order 
evidence.
These desiderata look straightforward enough. But they aren’t obviously compatible 
with one another. On the one hand, it seems like in order to accommodate his first-order 
evidence, Anton should believe that dose B is right. On the other hand, Anton’s higher-order 
evidence – Sam’s testimony – suggests that doctors in Anton’s situation are only 60% likely 
to pick the right dose. So it seems that in accommodating his higher-order evidence, Anton 
should become quite uncertain as to whether his evidence supports dose B. If Anton were to 
take both kinds of evidence at face value, his first-order and higher-order attitudes would 
exhibit an odd kind of incoherence. He might believe something like this: “B is the right 
dose. But I’m not sure what my evidence supports. Maybe it supports dose B, but maybe 
not.”
It is implausible that believing Moore-paradoxical combinations like this one could 
ever be rational.1 This observation suggests a third desideratum for a plausible account of 
what someone in Anton’s position should believe:
Desideratum 3: One’s rational first-order and higher-order doxastic attitudes should not 
be in tension.
1See Smithies [2012] for further discussion of this point. 
4According to Desideratum 3, the right way to accommodate first-order and higher-order 
evidence should not lead you to believing a Moore-paradoxical conjunction.
Evidential situations like Anton’s, in which an agent’s first-order evidence and higher-
order evidence come apart, pose a challenge for accounts of higher-order evidence. Each of 
our three desiderata is initially plausible, but it seems impossible to systematically and 
straightforwardly satisfy all of them. Many recent accounts have opted to give up one or 
another completely, and much of the recent literature could be described as a debate over 
which desideratum should be abandoned.
The purpose of this paper is to motivate and explore a view of the rational effect of 
higher-order evidence that respects all three desiderata. Our discussion will proceed as 
follows. In the first half, we survey some recent accounts of higher-order evidence that have 
abandoned one of our three desiderata in order to accommodate the other two. We argue that 
in each case, this comes at a serious cost. In the second half, we propose and defend a 
principle – Evidential Calibration – describing what agents in situations like Anton’s should 
believe. If Evidential Calibration is right, it turns out that tension between one’s first- and 
higher-order attitudes can sometimes be rational. But, we argue, Evidential Calibration still 
has the resources to explain the main motivation behind Desideratum 3: that it’s irrational to 
believe “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P.” An advocate of Evidential Calibration can 
distinguish between rational and irrational cases of tension between epistemic levels, while 
maintaining that there are genuine instances of both. In the last section, we will discuss some 
loose ends and questions for future work to explore.
2. Motivating the three desiderata
In the last section we introduced three desiderata for an account of the effect of higher-order 
evidence. In this section, we will motivate these desiderata by looking at problems for recent 
views that have given up one desideratum entirely in order to accommodate the other two.
2.1 Denying the import of higher-order evidence
Let’s return to Calculation. Here is one reaction you might have to Anton’s evidential 
situation: Since Anton’s first-order evidence supports dose B, he should believe that dose B is 
right. And since Anton knows that dose B is right, and that he came up with this answer after 
5looking at his evidence, he should also be completely certain that he has accommodated his 
evidence correctly.
This view is a natural extension of Kelly [2005]’s account of peer disagreement. Kelly  
writes:
“[O]nce I have thoroughly scrutinized the available evidence and arguments that bear 
on some question, the mere fact that an epistemic peer strongly disagrees with me 
about how that question should be answered does not itself tend to undermine the 
rationality of my continuing to believe as I do.  ... Indeed, confidently retaining my 
original belief might very well be the uniquely reasonable response in such 
circumstances.”2
One might motivate this response as follows: if you have first-order evidence relevant to a 
particular question, your higher-order evidence will be trumped or screened off by this first-
order evidence. What your evidence supports is an a priori matter, so if you have 
accommodated your first-order evidence correctly, you should be certain of this. In the 
presence of higher-order evidence, then, a rational agent should hold on to her initial first-
order attitude. She should also maintain her high confidence that her evidence does support 
the first-order attitude in question, and that this first-order attitude is rational.
On this view, Anton’s first-order evidence clearly has rational import. So this view 
respects Desideratum 1. It also respects Desideratum 3: since Anton should be certain that his 
first-order attitude is rational, his first-order and higher-order attitudes will not be in tension. 
(Rather than the Moore-paradoxical “P, but by evidence doesn’t support P”, Anton should 
believe, “P, and my evidence supports it.”) But this view does not respect Desideratum 2: 
Anton’s higher-order evidence has no rational bearing on what he should believe. If Anton is 
rational, on this view, he should ignore Sam’s testimony completely.
 Giving up Desideratum 2 incurs some serious costs. If the view under consideration is 
right, then after hearing Sam’s testimony, it would be rational for Anton to respond like this: 
“Sure, Sam, you’ve drugged me; but I must be immune to the drugs’ effects. After all, I’m 
highly confident that dose B is right, and my evidence supports it!” As many participants in 
the debate have pointed out, this seems irrational. If Anton takes Sam to be reliable, and 
believes that he has eaten the mushrooms, he should think it’s likely that his medical 
2 Kelly [2005], p. 4-5. It is not entirely clear whether Kelly’s position here is better described as giving up 
Desideratum 2, or as giving up Desideratum 3 like the “Level-Splitting” views discussed below. Nevertheless, 
many of the considerations Kelly raises could naturally be used to motivate giving up Desideratum 2, so it is 
helpful to look at his view in this context. Also see Titelbaum [ms].
6reasoning is impaired. Furthermore, he should think that he has probably reached a 
conclusion that is not supported by his evidence: if the mushrooms make doctors less reliable 
at prescribing the right dose, presumably they do so by impairing one’s ability to figure out 
which dose is right. So if Anton takes Sam’s testimony seriously, he should not be certain that  
his medical evidence supports what he thinks it supports.
2.2 Denying the import of first-order evidence
Christensen, Elga, Feldman, and Kelly (more recently) have all defended the position that 
higher-order evidence is epistemically significant: that in cases like Anton’s, one is rationally 
required to reduce confidence in one’s first-order attitudes in response to higher-order 
evidence. So after hearing Sam’s testimony, Anton should become less confident that his 
first-order evidence supports dose B and less confident that dose B is right.
 Thinking about why Anton should reduce confidence in dose B might lead one to the 
view that higher-order evidence does all the work in determining what Anton should believe. 
Consider the following line of thought: upon learning about the mushrooms, Anton should 
become less confident that B is the right dose. How much should Anton reduce confidence? 
We said that Sam told Anton that doctors in his position only prescribed the right dose 60% 
of the time. So a natural view to take is that after hearing Sam’s testimony, Anton should only 
be .6 confident that dose B is right. Moreover, you might think, Anton should be certain that 
his total evidence supports .6 confidence in B. Once he has reduced his confidence that B is 
the correct dose, Anton should be certain that he has accommodated all of his evidence 
rationally.
 White [2009] discusses a view along these lines, and suggests (though stops short of 
defending) the following as a general principle for how to rationally accommodate higher-
order evidence:
Guess Calibration: If I draw the conclusion that P on the basis of any evidence E, 
my credence in P should equal my prior expected reliability with respect to P.3
3White [2009]. White calls this the “Calibration Rule”. White is not explicit about what he means by “draw[ing] 
the conclusion”; sometimes he writes as if it amounts to forming a belief, but the thought behind the rule is 
general enough to also apply to cases where we should suspend judgment. We will interpret it as a view about 
educated guesses, so as to stay neutral about this question. (We will say more about how we understand 
“educated guesses” in Section 3, when we spell out our view, Evidential Calibration.)
7Your reliability with respect to P is how likely you are to come to a true guess about P. White 
characterizes reliability like this:
“I suggest we think about [reliability] along the lines that we think about objective 
chance. … This notion of reliability is a modal one, being logically independent of any 
actual performance. A reliable thermometer has an objective propensity to give accurate 
readings, even if by some unfortunate fluke it rarely does (conversely a hopelessly 
unreliable thermometer might by chance give accurate readings).”4
Guess Calibration deals with one’s prior expected reliability in order to accommodate cases 
when you are uncertain about how reliable a certain process is. In those situations, you might 
consider a number of possibilities for how reliable the process is, and assign some credence 
to each. In those cases, you can find the expected reliability of the process by taking an 
average of all of your candidate levels of reliability, weighted by how likely you take each 
one to be right.
 White points out that plausibly, for any process, your credence that the process will 
produce an accurate outcome should equal the expected reliability of that process. It’s also 
plausible that, after seeing which outcome a process produced, your credence that this 
outcome is accurate should equal your prior expected reliability of the process given that this 
is the outcome. Guess Calibration simply extends this general line of thought to our own 
cognitive processes. (White writes: “Given my cognitive capacities, what evidence I have to 
go on, and various environmental factors, I have a certain propensity to form a true belief as 
to whether p.”5) And if we treat our own reasoning as we treat any other indicator of the truth, 
its expected reliability should rationally affect how much we trust its deliverances.
According to Guess Calibration, higher-order evidence does have a rational effect on 
what one should believe in evidential situations like Anton’s. (Since it lowers Anton’s 
expected reliability, it also lowers his rational credence in the dose he guessed to be correct.) 
Guess Calibration therefore meets Desideratum 2. It also meets Desideratum 3. According to 
Guess Calibration, what Anton should believe is determined by two factors: the fact that he 
has drawn the conclusion that B is the correct dose, and Sam’s testimony concerning his 
expected reliability. Plausibly, Anton could be rationally certain about what those two factors 
are, and about how Guess Calibration says they should be accommodated. So if Guess 
4 White [2009], p. 234.
5 Ibid.
8Calibration is right, Anton can be rationally certain that he has responded to his total evidence 
rationally.
But note that the fact that Anton’s first-order evidence supports dose B, rather than A, 
has dropped out of the picture; it has no rational bearing on what Anton should believe. Guess 
Calibration gives up Desideratum 1 completely. This has some troubling consequences. 
Suppose that, as before, Anton rationally concludes that B is the correct dose for his patient. 
In the next room over, Anton’s colleague Anna evaluates the same first-order evidence – but 
unlike Anton, Anna irrationally concludes that dose A is right. Both Anton and Anna receive 
the same testimony from Sam concerning their unreliability. Then Anton and Anna revise 
their first-order attitudes: Anton becomes .6 confident that B is the correct dose, while Anna 
becomes .4 confident that A is the correct dose.
There is an important asymmetry between Anton and Anna. Anton accommodated 
their shared first-order evidence correctly, while Anna did not. But according to Guess 
Calibration, both Anton and Anna are fully rational: both drew a conclusion about which dose 
was correct, and both reduced confidence in that guess in response to Sam’s testimony. So 
Guess Calibration does not capture the asymmetry between the two.6
This problem becomes more pressing if we consider a very simple case. Imagine 
someone who has absolutely no reason to doubt her reliability at assessing her evidence. 
Perhaps she has never rationally erred before, and has no reason to think that she faces any 
special problems today (for instance, due to mushrooms). Free from these higher-order 
complications, today she is evaluating some evidence which supports P to degree .8.7 What 
should her credence in P be? Well, since she has no reason to expect that she will 
accommodate her evidence irrationally, her expected reliability in guessing truly about P 
should be .8 as well. But suppose that on this occasion, against the odds and for the very first 
6 This is one of the main lines of criticism that has been raised in the disagreement and higher-order evidence 
literature against views on which higher-order evidence mandates reducing confidence in one’s conclusions. 
See, e.g., Kelly [2010] for an example of this objection in the context of peer disagreement; see Christensen 
[2007 b] and [2011] for responses. See also Weatherson [ms] for more extensive criticism of views on which 
accommodating higher-order evidence requires us to “screen off” first-order evidence completely. Christensen 
([2011], section 1) denies that his “Conciliatory” view is committed to rejecting Desideratum 1. According to 
Christensen,  “Conciliationism tells us what the proper response is to one particular kind of evidence. … If one 
starts out by botching things epistemically, and then takes correct account of one bit of evidence, it’s unlikely 
that one will end up with fully rational beliefs.” (p. 4, highlighting ours) Our project can be seen as 
complementary: our aim is to articulate how one should respond to one’s total evidence. 
7 Here we are thinking of the cleanest case: someone who has no reason to doubt her reliability. This may be 
distinct from someone who has good reason to think she’s reliable. We will return to this issue in section 5.3.
9time, she misjudges her evidence. She concludes ~P rather than P, and ends up with .8 
confidence in ~P.
Is this response rational? Guess Calibration says that it is. But surely, the fact that an 
agent has no reason to doubt her reliability does not make any conclusion she comes up with 
rational; she is still rationally required to believe what her evidence supports. To deny that 
would be a drastic departure from normal ways of thinking about evidence. (That is, if the 
evidence supports P to degree .8, it’s hard to deny that absent any other factors, one should 
have .8 confidence in P.) The right account of higher-order evidence should at least maintain 
that first-order evidence has its usual bearing in cases where there is no reason for higher-
order doubt.
So the right account of higher-order evidence should respect Desideratum 1: what’s 
rational to believe should be determined – at least in part – by what one’s first-order evidence 
actually supports.
2.3 Allowing tension between first-order and higher-order attitudes
We have seen that giving up on either Desideratum 1 or Desideratum 2 raises serious 
problems. Surveying this state of affairs, one might naturally wonder if there is a third way to 
go: perhaps the rational response in situations like Anton’s is to have one’s final doxastic state 
determined by both one’s first-order and one’s higher-order evidence. So, one might defend 
the following verdict in Calculation:
Anton is rationally required to be highly confident in dose B. Anton is also rationally 
required to be only .6 confident that his evidence supports that dose.
Views defending this verdict have become popular in recent literature.8 Weatherson, for 
instance, writes that an agent in a situation like Anton’s “...should believe p, and she should 
believe that she has most reason to not believe p.”9 According to this view, Anton’s rational 
8See Coates [2012], Hazlett [2012], Weatherson [ms], Lasonen-Aarnio [forthcoming], and Wedgwood [2011] for 
views roughly along these lines. Williamson ([notes a] and [notes b]) defends the view that one can know that P, 
but that it can be highly improbable on one’s evidence that one knows that P. Coates and Weatherson focus on 
the rationality of believing conjunctions like, “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P”; others accept verdicts 
along these lines as a consequence of their other commitments. We will not go through the details of what these 
authors say here, so what we say here should not be taken as definitive arguments against their particular views. 
Rather, we focus on the implications for a certain natural way of spelling out a Level-Splitting view, and 
(eventually) argue why we should not go this way.
9 Weatherson [ms], p. 15. He continues: “And, assuming a natural connection between evidence and reason, that 
in turn isn’t very different from it being the case that she should believe p, and she should believe that her 
evidence does not support p.”
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first-order attitude is solely determined by what his first-order evidence supports, and his 
rational higher-order attitude is solely determined by what his higher-order evidence 
supports. The view therefore respects Desiderata 1 and 2. But it gives up on Desideratum 3: 
Anton’s first-order and higher-order attitudes are obviously in tension. For the remainder of 
the paper, we will refer to views that violate Desideratum 3 in this way as “Level-Splitting” 
views. According to Level-Splitting, in cases like Calculation, it can be rational to believe 
something of the form, “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P”, or “P, but I shouldn’t believe 
P”.
The Level-Splitting conclusion is intuitively odd and has seemed highly implausible 
to many people: it is commonly held that doxastic states like this can never be rational. Some 
have taken this point to be so obvious, and denying it to be so beyond the pale, that they 
presuppose it or take it as a premise rather than offering an argument for it.10 But defenders of 
Level-Splitting views have argued that perhaps giving up Desideratum 3 isn’t so terrible after 
all. They point out, first of all, that first-order evidence and higher-order evidence directly 
bear on very different subject matters. Anton’s first-order evidence bears directly on 
anesthesia doses, while his higher-order evidence bears directly on Anton’s rationality. Why 
think that there should be a general rational constraint on how one’s attitudes about these two 
completely different subject matters should relate? Secondly, similar kinds of level-tension 
are already familiar from ethics. There’s nothing odd about endorsing conjunctions such as 
“Sally ought to φ, but she ought to believe that she has most reason not to φ”: so epistemic 
versions, some argue, should not seem so odd either.11
One might also be attracted to Level-Splitting views because of skepticism about 
Desideratum 3 itself. Full compliance with Desideratum 3 seems to rule out any rational 
doubt about whether one’s doxastic states are rational. But plausibly we can be rationally 
uncertain about what our evidence supports. Sometimes we may even be rationally uncertain 
about what our evidence is.12 Calculation looks like a paradigmatic case of such rational 
10See, e.g., Smithies [2012] and Titelbaum [ms]. Feldman [2005] defends a view broadly in line with 
Desideratum 3, and writes that “[o]ne wonders what circumstances could make [level-tension] reasonable” (p. 
108-9).
11 See Coates [2012] and Weatherson [ms] for this point, and for analogies to ethics.
12 See Williamson [2000], especially Chapter 4.
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uncertainty. So, one might think, insofar as Desideratum 3 is incompatible with rational 
uncertainty in Calculation, we should just give up on it altogether.
 Whatever considerations tell in favor of Level-Splitting, though, the intuitive costs of 
the view are significant. (We will discuss this issue in more depth in section 4.) We can see 
this especially clearly when we consider how Anton should act in light of his doxastic state. 
Imagine Anton responding like this: “Sure, Sam, you’ve drugged me; it’s probably irrational 
for me to be so confident that dose B is right for my patient. But B is right, so who cares if 
I’m rational? Fetch me that syringe!”13 This response seems patently irrational. Normally, if 
we are striving to do what’s right, we act in the way we think is best – and normally that 
corresponds to what our evidence supports. So surely Anton shouldn’t be so confident that 
he’s doing the right thing. Maybe instead he should feel guilty as he reaches for the needle: “I 
shouldn’t be doing this”, he might say; “I have no right to be so confident that this dose is 
correct. But it is correct, so here I go...” As much as it seemed irrational for Anton to 
cheerfully administer the medicine, doing so reluctantly is just as bad: if Anton is so 
confident that dose B is right, he should think that giving dose B is the right thing to do. What 
is the most rational way for Anton to react, then? Either way, treating the first-order and 
higher-order propositions as completely different subject matters leads to strange results.
3. Evidential Calibration
So far we have argued that views that give up on one of the three desiderata incur intuitive 
costs. We will now introduce a new principle and show how it accommodates Desiderata 1 
and 2; in the next section we will discuss how it accommodates Desideratum 3.
We suggest that after hearing Sam’s testimony, Anton should be .6 confident that dose 
B is right. He should be .6 confident because he expects to be 60% reliable; he should be .6 
confident in dose B because that’s what his first-order evidence actually supports. More 
specifically, we want to consider the following principle as a constraint on an ideally rational 
agent’s credences:
Evidential Calibration: When one’s evidence favors P over ~P, one’s credence in P 
should equal the expected reliability of one’s educated guess that P.
13 This scenario parallels Christensen’s “Reasonable Prudence” (Christensen [2010], p. 12).
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A rational agent following Evidential Calibration will match her credence in the proposition 
favored by her evidence to her expected reliability in making an educated guess that P. 
Together with the natural thought behind Desideratum 2 – that higher-order evidence should 
sometimes rationally affect our beliefs – Evidential Calibration tells us how we should revise 
our confidence in first-order propositions on the basis of higher-order evidence.
You may recognize Evidential Calibration as a close relative of White’s Guess 
Calibration. Indeed, Evidential Calibration captures many of its cousin’s benefits. But, 
crucially, Evidential Calibration also respects Desideratum 1. This is because Evidential 
Calibration gives a different explanation for why Anton should be .6 confident in dose B. 
According to Evidential Calibration, Anton should be .6 confident in B because it’s what his 
first-order evidence supports and not – as Guess Calibration had it – because B is the 
conclusion he came up with.
The details of Evidential Calibration will require some unpacking. First, what is it for 
your evidence to favor P? By this we mean simply that your rational credence in P is higher 
than your rational credence in ~P. Second, like Guess Calibration, Evidential Calibration is 
about educated guesses. As we understand it, to make a rational educated guess that P, it is 
not necessary to also form an all-out belief that P. Rather, making an educated guess that P is 
compatible with believing P, suspending judgment about P, or having some intermediate 
degree of credence in P. Anton might be rational in guessing that dose B is right, even though 
it would not be rational for him to form the all-out belief without stronger evidence.
Finally, what is the expected reliability of one’s educated guess that P? If your guess 
corresponds to the option you have the highest credence in, the reliability of your guess is the 
probability that you will assign the highest credence to the option that is true – it is the 
probability, that you would get the answer right, if you had to choose. Since rational agents 
are often uncertain about their reliability, we are concerned here with rational expected 
reliability: the weighted average of different possibilities for how reliable you could be, as 
assessed by your own lights. We will follow White’s modal understanding of “reliability” and 
“expected reliability” – like Guess Calibration, Evidential Calibration is concerned with your 
expected propensity to guess correctly. Your expected propensity to guess correctly that P in a 
given situation depends on at least two features of that situation: it depends both on your 
cognitive capacities – your ability to evaluate your first-order evidence – and on the type of 
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first-order evidence that’s available to you.14 (Note that your expected reliability may well 
come apart from your actual propensity to guess correctly. This will be often be the case 
when you have misleading evidence. In fact, this is exactly what happens in Anton’s 
situation. Anton’s expected reliability is .6, while his actual reliability – given that the 
mushrooms he took were just regular dried porcini – is much higher.) Evidential Calibration 
says that your credence in the option that your evidence favors should match the expectation 
of how reliable your educated guess will be.15
That’s all we’ll say now about the content of Evidential Calibration. Why should we 
think it’s right? First, Evidential Calibration satisfies Desideratum 1: it says that one’s 
rational beliefs should be determined, in part, by the bearing of one’s first-order evidence. So, 
in Anton’s case, Anton should have higher confidence in dose B than in dose A. This means 
that Evidential Calibration gives the right verdicts in the cases that created problems for 
Guess Calibration. First, consider the case in which your evidence rationalizes .8 credence in 
P and you have no reason to doubt your reliability. Nevertheless, you slip up and become .8 
confident in ~P instead. Unlike Guess Calibration, Evidential Calibration does not yield the 
verdict that you are fully rational: Evidential Calibration says that if your evidence 
rationalizes .8 credence in P, the rational response is to be .8 confident in P. Evidential 
Calibration also captures the asymmetry between Anton and Anna (Anton’s colleague who 
14 In Anton’s case, propensity to guess right “in a given situation” means something like this: looking at the 
particular type of test results, while under the influence of Sam’s magic mushrooms. The relevant situation here 
must be understood in way that is “independent of” or “prior to” his particular evidence or reasoning about 
which dose to give his patient.  (If we included Anton’s first-order evidence and allowed it to have its usual 
epistemic role, it would seem that Anton should remain confident in his guess on the basis of that evidence.) The 
intuitive thought here is clear enough, although spelling out the appropriate “independence principle” is a 
delicate job. We will assume here that the job can be done. See Christensen [2007], [2009], [2011], Elga [2007], 
and Vavova [ms], among others, for further discussion of these issues. If no good independence principle can be 
formulated, this will raise challenges for any account (including Guess Calibration) on which higher-order 
evidence rationally affects first-order beliefs.
15 An outstanding issue: what if your evidence supports .5 confidence in each of P and ~P? Then it does not 
favor either option. EC is silent on how you should respond to higher-order evidence in this kind of situation.
Thinking more about this kind of case, however, it’s unclear how we could have HOE that would 
rationally change our credences. If your evidence supports .5 in each of P and ~P, you would be justified in 
guessing either way; you would guess arbitrarily. Guessing arbitrarily, you would expect your reliability to be 
equal to chance. But suppose you have HOE that suggests that your reliability is worse than chance. What 
should you think? It looks like in this case you can’t win: no matter which option you choose, you should expect 
to be wrong. (See Egan and Elga [2005] for more on this topic. They argue that you cannot rationally expect 
yourself to be anti-reliable.) On the other hand, what if your HOE suggests that you’re better than chance? Then 
you have a different kind of puzzle. What explains your high reliability? A guardian angel guiding you to the 
truth? A knack for extra-sensory perception? If it is rational to change your credence in these situations, perhaps 
it’s because you have some additional first-order evidence (about the guardian angel, for example). More likely, 
we think, it will simply not be rational for you to change your credence if your evidence is no stronger than 
chance.
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mistakenly concluded that A, rather than B, is the right dose). Unlike Guess Calibration, 
Evidential Calibration says that Anna is not fully rational. This is because both Anton and 
Anna should be .6 confident in the dose that their shared first-order evidence actually 
supports; if Anna ends up with .6 confidence in A, she is not fully rational. 
Second, Evidential Calibration satisfies Desideratum 2, by allowing higher-order 
evidence to rationally influence our first-order attitudes. In doing so, Evidential Calibration is 
in line with verdicts various “conciliatory” or “equal weight” positions have given regarding 
how we should respond to particular kinds of higher-order evidence, like peer disagreement.16
Finally, Evidential Calibration explains a general and plausible intuition about the 
relationship between one’s rational attitudes about one’s own reliability and one’s rational 
first-order attitudes: it explains why someone who is rationally certain that she has responded 
to her evidence rationally is generally entitled to be more opinionated than someone who has 
doubts about her own rationality. This is because according to Evidential Calibration, your 
rational credence in P should match the expected reliability of your making an educated guess 
that P. And, as we have seen, the expected reliability of making an educated guess that P will 
typically depend on both the strength of your first-order evidence and your own ability to 
assessing the evidence rationally. Thus, suppose again that you are looking at some 
meteorological data, D, and you know that given evidence like D, it tends to rain 75% of the 
time. Furthermore, you are completely confident that you are identifying and accommodating 
your meteorological evidence correctly. How confident should you be that it will rain? 
Intuitively, you should be .75 confident. And Evidential Calibration gives us exactly this 
verdict. That’s because since you are certain that you will evaluate your evidence correctly, 
you should expect that you will make an educated guess that P if and only if the evidence in 
fact favors P. If your educated guess perfectly tracks your evidence, your expected reliability 
of guessing that P should be the same as the degree of your evidential support for P. Your 
credence that it will rain, given that you make an educated guess that it will rain based on 
your evidence, should be the same as your credence that it will rain given your first-order 
16 See, especially, Elga [2007] on how one should accommodate evidence of disagreement: 
Equal weight view: Upon finding out that an advisor disagrees, your probability that you are right 
should equal your prior conditional probability that you would be right. Prior to what? Prior to your 
thinking through the disputed issue, and finding out what the advisor thinks of it. Conditional on what? 
On whatever you have learned about the circumstances of the disagreement.
Evidential Calibration accommodates Elga’s principle, but it goes farther: it is formulated more generally, and it 
gives an account of what to believe on one’s total evidence, making the contribution of one’s first-order 
evidence clear.
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evidence alone – that is, .75. In these situations, Evidential Calibration reduces to the 
principle that your rational credence in P should match the probability of P given the first-
order evidence.
What if you have reason to think that you don’t always evaluate the evidence correctly  
– that perhaps sometimes you guess that P even when your evidence favors some alternative 
to P? In general, evaluating our evidence rationally tends to lead us to the truth; usually our 
evidence isn’t systematically misleading. If you guess that P, but your evidence favors ~P, it 
is likely that your guess is false. Reasons to doubt our rationality often give us reasons to 
suspect that we will be unreliable: so, evidence that we’re irrational will usually lower our 
expected reliability as well.17 And, according to Evidential Calibration, when we have reason 
to doubt our reliability, we should revise confidence in our first-order beliefs. Evidential 
Calibration therefore makes sense of the intuition that when we suspect that we might be 
irrational, we should leave ourselves a doxastic margin for error.
4. Meeting Desideratum 3
We saw that Level-Splitting, which straightforwardly accommodates both first-order and 
higher-order evidence, faces serious problems in its rejection of Desideratum 3: it allows 
one’s rational first-order and higher-order attitudes to be in conflict. If Evidential Calibration 
also accommodates both kinds of evidence, won’t it have to reject Desideratum 3 as well?
 The aim of this section is to look more closely at what it takes to satisfy Desideratum 
3. What does it mean for first-order and higher-order attitudes to conflict, and why is this 
conflict irrational? First, we will take a step back and look at one of the original motivations 
for Desideratum 3: the thought that it’s irrational to have high confidence in both “P” and 
“my evidence doesn’t support P”. We argue that Evidential Calibration can vindicate this 
thought, and helps us rules out a certain class of bad combinations of first-order and higher-
order attitudes that Level-Splitting permits; this gives us reason to think that Evidential 
17 The exact relationship between your expected reliability and these other factors may not be straightforward or 
simple, and we cannot address the question in full here. But we can say some general things about this 
relationship. First, if you are rationally confident that you are perfectly reliable at rationally assessing your 
evidence, your expected reliability should just equal the strength of that evidence. Could you rationally regard 
yourself as anti-reliable with respect to some question – i.e. could your expected reliability be significantly 
lower than chance? According to Egan and Elga [2005], the answer is “no”. On pain of incoherence, an agent 
with decent access to her own beliefs must assign low probability to the claim that she is an anti-expert about 
the subject matter. Thus, there are, arguably, independent constraints on the lower bound of your expected 
reliability.
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Calibration does respect Desideratum 3, after all. In the last part of this section we bring up a 
remaining puzzle for Evidential Calibration and suggest a response.
4.1 “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P”
In cases like Calculation, Level-Splitting views say that it can be rational to have high 
confidence in both “P” and “my evidence doesn’t support P”. This combination of attitudes 
strikes us as clearly irrational, and a clear violation of Desideratum 3. But it would be nice if 
we could say more about what’s wrong with it, and why it’s not merely counterintuitive on its 
face. In this section we provide such an argument.18
 To see what’s wrong with believing (or having high confidence in) these Moore-
paradoxical combinations, let’s look back at Level-Splitting. In a single case like Calculation, 
Level-Splitting says that it can be rational to have high confidence in both “P” and “my 
evidence doesn’t support P”. This is implausible on its face, but further problems emerge 
when we consider what the view will say if cases like Calculation happen again and again.
Suppose that after talking to Sam, Anton calculates the doses for a number of other 
patients. His reasoning yields the doses P, Q, R, S, etc. Since we’ve assumed that Anton is not 
in fact rationally impaired, let’s suppose that these calculations are all correct, and that in 
each case Anton has responded rationally to his evidence. But Anton doesn’t know this; he is 
confident that he is under the influence of Sam’s mushrooms.
Level-Splitting will say that in each case, Anton should become highly confident of 
the dose that his first-order evidence supports. At the end of the long sequence of cases, then, 
Anton should be rationally highly confident of each of the following:
P: P is the correct dose for patient 1.
Q: Q is the correct dose for patient 2.
… etc.
If Anton is keeping track, he can survey his prescription history and conclude the following:
P1: I got all of these calculations (P, Q, R, S, …) right. My track record is amazing!
But according to Level-Splitting, Anton should also be rationally highly confident in:
18 Though many authors assume that this combination of attitudes is irrational, direct arguments for this claim 
are surprisingly hard to come by. See Christensen [2007] for an argument that one should not be certain of some 
logical truth, while being less than certain of one’s own rationality in deducing the logical truth; see also White 
[2009] and [ms]; and Horowitz [2013]. The arguments in this section are expanded upon in Horowitz [2013]. 
See Elga [2013] for an independent, but complementary, proposal regarding when level-tension is and is not 
rational.
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P2: Only 60% of P, Q, R, S, … are supported by my evidence. I’m only 60% reliable 
at reaching rational educated guesses.
P1 and P2, together, seem to license some odd-looking reasoning. Anton can wonder: “How 
strange! Since I expected to be 60% reliable, I thought I would only get the right answer 
about 60% of the time. But I’m doing much better than that – I’ve had a much better success 
rate than 60%. I must be more reliable than I thought I was. What could explain my excellent 
performance?” Initially, Anton might just think that he’s getting lucky. But as he continues to 
compile a better and better track record, the divergence between his actual track record and 
the track record he rationally expected, given his expected reliability, will become more and 
more remarkable. The chances that he would irrationally guess correctly so many times in a 
row are very slim.
So, reflecting on his surprisingly good track record, Anton should be able to conclude 
that there is some other explanation for why his track record systematically exceeds what he 
would have expected. Specifically, he should conclude:
C: The mushrooms must not have affected me! I’m actually highly reliable. 
This is not a rational way of coming to believe that one’s educated guesses are reliable. 
Crucially, it’s problematic that Anton can go through this reasoning without ever performing 
an independent check on whether his doses were right, or on whether he had in fact been 
drugged. This is bootstrapping.19
Anton’s doxastic state in Calculation – having high confidence in P, and having high 
confidence that his evidence doesn’t support P – licenses bad reasoning. So there must be 
something wrong with Anton’s doxastic state, and the particular type of tension between 
Anton’s first-order and higher-order attitudes.
4.2 No problem for Evidential Calibration
We now have an argument against a certain type of level-tension, permitted by Level-
Splitting: it licenses bootstrapping. In this section, we’ll see that this argument gives 
Evidential Calibration a substantial advantage.
First, we should note that unlike Level-Splitting, Evidential Calibration does not 
allow bootstrapping. According to Level-Splitting, Anton could bootstrap because he could 
19See Horowitz [2014], White [2009] and [ms], as well as Christensen [2007], for discussion of similar points. 
See Vogel [2000] and Cohen [2002], e.g., for more general discussion of bootstrapping.
18
acquire a track record that was much better than he would have predicted, given his expected 
reliability. But Evidential Calibration straightforwardly rules out this possibility.20 According 
to Evidential Calibration, one’s confidence in any proposition P cannot rationally exceed 
one’s expected reliability about P. Suppose Anton follows Evidential Calibration while 
calculating several patients’ doses in a row. If his expected reliability is only 60% in each 
case, Anton’s confidence in each of P, Q, R, and S should be only .6. So his apparent track 
record will be no better than he would have predicted.
We can see why Level-Splitting faces a problem here, and why Evidential Calibration 
does not, by comparing Level-Splitting to simple reliabilism about justification. On a simple 
reliabilist view, one’s belief that P is justified if and only if it was produced by a reliable 
process: one need not know, or even believe, that the process is reliable. But if this is right, 
someone wondering whether one of her (in fact reliable) belief-forming processes is reliable 
could very easily find out that it is by bootstrapping. All she would need to do is form some 
beliefs using that process, note (without an independent check) that all of these beliefs are 
true and were formed using the process, and conclude via induction that the process must be 
reliable.21
Simple reliabilism sanctions bootstrapping because it lacks a principle like Evidential 
Calibration. Even when you have reason to think that a certain (in fact reliable) belief-
forming process is unreliable, simple reliabilism says that you can rationally use the process 
anyway. More sophisticated reliabilist views try to rule out rational bootstrapping by building 
in a defeat condition: Goldman, for instance, holds that evidence that a process is unreliable 
can defeat our justification in beliefs formed through that process.22 On these more 
sophisticated views, when you have positive reason to believe that a process is unreliable, 
you cannot rationally maintain the beliefs produced via that process. So, according to these 
views, you cannot rationally acquire a good track record when you rationally expect that your 
track record will be bad.
20See also White [2009] for discussion of how Guess Calibration prevents rational bootstrapping.
21See, e.g., Vogel [2000] and Cohen [2002].
22See Goldman [1986]. See Smithies [2012] for further (skeptical) discussion of Goldman’s no-defeaters clause.
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But by rejecting a principle like Evidential Calibration, Level-Splitting explicitly rules 
out this kind of defeat – at least when the belief-forming process you are doubting is your 
own rationality. Because of this, Level-Splitting also allows bootstrapping.
Evidential Calibration can help us understand what’s wrong with the kind of level-
tension that Level-Splitting recommends in cases like Calculation. And it can also help us 
understand why this kind of tension seemed so odd to begin with. Since evidence that we are 
irrational is often also evidence that we are unreliable, we should in be less confident in P 
when we have reason to suspect that our educated guesses about P are unsupported by our 
evidence.
4.3 Desideratum 3 as Evidential Calibration?
We set out, in this section, to see whether Evidential Calibration satisfies Desideratum 3; we 
worried that, in taking account of both first-order and higher-order evidence, Evidential 
Calibration would end up in just as bad a position as Level-Splitting. By now we have seen 
enough to draw some preliminary conclusions. First, we saw an argument against certain 
paradigmatic violations of Desideratum 3. While Level-Splitting runs into problems with this 
argument, Evidential Calibration does not. We also saw that Evidential Calibration can help 
us understand why Level-Splitting had these problems, and gave an explanation for the 
intuitive oddness that violations of Desideratum 3 produce.
 All of this suggests that Evidential Calibration does, in fact, meet Desideratum 3. 
Evidential Calibration gives us a plausible picture of the relationship between epistemic 
levels that respects and vindicates our core intuitive judgments. In fact, we might take 
Evidential Calibration itself to embody the right way of making Desideratum 3 more precise.
4.4 Rational level-tension for Evidential Calibration?
Given what we have seen so far, there is good reason to think that Evidential Calibration 
rules out problematic level-conflicts, and therefore satisfies Desideratum 3. But Evidential 
Calibration does not rule out all level-conflicts as rational.
 We originally observed that it seems irrational to have high confidence in “P, but my 
evidence doesn’t support P”. Someone in this epistemic state has high credence in P, but takes 
her credence to be much higher than the credence warranted by her evidence. Generalizing 
this thought, it is tempting to think that we weaker types of mismatch are irrational, too. For 
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example, it seems odd for someone to to think that her credence in P is too high, even if she is 
unsure about which lower credence it would be rational to adopt. (There may be a number of 
different candidate credences that she considers as possibilities, but that are on balance lower 
than the credence in P that she currently has.23)
 We can capture this tempting line of thought with the following, more precise 
principle:
Rational Reflection: An agent’s first-order credence in P should match her expected 
rational credence in P.24
Your expected rational credence in a proposition is average of all of the candidate credences 
that you think might be rational, weighted by how likely you take it to be that each one is 
rational. When you think that your credence in P is too high, but are unsure about which 
lower credence it would be rational to adopt, your credence in P comes apart from your 
expected rational credence in P. By prohibiting this kind of mismatch, Rational Reflection 
places some limits on which combinations of first- and higher order states can be rational: for 
example, it will prevent you from having rational high confidence in something like “P, but 
my evidence supports ~P”, or “P, but my evidence probably supports a lower level of 
confidence than the one I have.”
Rational Reflection is an initially plausible account of tension between epistemic 
levels. But it is incompatible with Evidential Calibration.25 To see why, let’s return to 
Calculation.26 Recall that Evidential Calibration said that Anton is rationally required to be .6 
confident that dose B was right, and that furthermore, this is the only rational response to 
23 Some authors would argue that in cases like this, we should have imprecise or “mushy” credences. We won’t 
discuss this possibility here, as it will not affect our arguments.
24 See Christensen [2010] gives a formal definition of this principle:
Rational Reflection: Cr(A|Pr(A) = n) = n
where Cr is your credence in A, and Pr is the function describing the ideally rational credence for you to have in 
A. Strictly speaking, our version of Rational Reflection is entailed by Christensen’s formal account, but does not 
entail it; however, this distinction won’t make a difference for our purposes. See Christensen [2010] and Elga 
[2013] for further discussion of this principle.
25 For the record, Rational Reflection is also incompatible with Level-Splitting. Since Level-Splitting licenses 
high confidence in “P, but most likely my evidence doesn’t support P”, e.g., it allows one’s rational credence in 
P to be much higher than his expected rational credence in P.
26 Our discussion here follows Christensen [2010] and Elga [2013]. Our Calculation case is meant to parallel the 
case of the unmarked clock discussed in those papers, and in Williamson [notes a] and [notes b], with at least 
one salient difference: in the clock case, we are asked to imagine someone who is uncertain about what her 
evidence is, but knows what is supported in various evidential situations. In Calculation, Anton knows what his 
evidence is and is unsure what it supports.
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Anton’s situation. Let’s suppose that Anton becomes .6 confident of dose B, as Evidential 
Calibration suggests. Let’s also suppose that Anton, being a self-conscious follower of 
Evidential Calibration himself, believes there is only one rational response to his total 
evidence: to have .6 confidence in whatever dose his first-order evidence actually favors. 
Putting those pieces together, Anton cannot be rationally fully confident that his .6 
confidence in B is rational. If the mushrooms make his educated guesses less reliable, then 
they must do so by impairing his ability to assess his evidence. Anton should be less than 
certain that the dose that he guessed to be right (dose B) was in fact favored by his evidence.
But if Anton’s evidence doesn’t favor dose B, it must favor dose A. (This kind of 
evidence, we can assume, always supports one dose over the other.) If Anton’s evidence 
favors A, then his credence in B is irrationally high. So Anton should think that his credence 
in dose B might be too high. He also knows that in his situation, the highest credence that 
could be rational for him to have in either dose is .6. So according to Evidential Calibration, 
Anton might rationally think: “My credence in dose B might be rational, or it might be too 
high. But it’s definitely not too low.”
Anton should be uncertain whether his first-order doxastic attitude is rational, and 
furthermore, he should think that on balance, if he’s irrational, there is a particular direction 
in which he is erring. According to Evidential Calibration, then, Anton’s credence in dose B 
should not match his expected rational credence in dose B.
Rational Reflection gives us a prima facie plausible way to spell out what it is for 
epistemic levels to conflict. But as a rational requirement, it turns out to be incompatible with 
Evidential Calibration. So we face a choice: give up Evidential Calibration, or accept that 
some instances of tension between epistemic levels can be rational.
We think that the second option is an attractive one. First of all, we have already seen 
that, in accepting some rational level-tension, Evidential Calibration does not put us in the 
same dire situation as Level-Splitting. Rather than rejecting any systematic rational relation 
between epistemic levels, as Level-Splitting does, Evidential Calibration says that there is 
such a relationship, and helps us understand what that relationship is. Second, in accepting 
Rational Reflection as an epistemic norm, we risk running into the problems we have already 
seen for views that give up Desideratum 1 or 2: it may be hard to adopt Rational Reflection 
without facing (one version of) those problems as well. Third, Rational Reflection rules out 
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nearly all cases of rational uncertainty about what one should believe.27 This may seem like 
the wrong result – especially given situations like Calculation, in which it is plausibly rational 
to be unsure about what one’s evidence supports.
And finally: while Rational Reflection is one way of predicting and explaining our 
intuitive judgments, it would be nice to have an additional argument showing whether these 
intuitive judgments are right, and whether Rational Reflection is the right way to explain 
them. We have such an argument in favor of Evidential Calibration. Without a corresponding 
argument to bolster intuitions in favor of Rational Reflection, we should tentatively conclude 
that, while mismatch between one’s credence in P and one’s expected rational credence in P is 
odd, it is not always irrational. Adopting Evidential Calibration yields a surprising conclusion 
about which combinations of first-order and higher-order attitudes we can rationally hold. 
But this conclusion is not, we think, too surprising to accept.28
5. Compromises and outstanding questions
So far we have set out the case for EC: we have shown how it avoids the problems faced by 
views that give up on one of the three desiderata completely, and we have argued that it gives 
us a plausible way of understanding Desideratum 3 in particular. But in accommodating all 
three desiderata, EC does have to make some concessions. In this last section we will look at 
three outstanding puzzles for EC. The first two involve compromises that EC must make in 
striking its balance between the three desiderata. The last is a question about how to interpret 
EC when we have no higher-order evidence at all. All three puzzles point to potential 
problems for EC, and we cannot solve any of them here once and for all. What we will aim to 
do instead is to set out what we see as some promising lines of response, and to shed light on 
some of the salient choice points for any account of the significance of higher-order evidence.
5.1 The problem of general defeat
Much of the literature on higher-order evidence focuses on cases where our higher-order 
evidence is fairly targetted. Our case, Calculation, is the same way: we specified that Anton’s 
27 One kind of uncertainty it permits is cases where, for example, one is unsure whether one’s credence is too 
high or too low, but takes either possibility to be equally likely. See Christensen [2010] for further discussion.
28 Elga [2013] draws a similar conclusion regarding Rational Reflection, but approaches the issue from a 
different angle.
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HOE in such a way that the mushrooms affected a very specific type of reasoning under very 
specific circumstances. Anton rationally doubted his ability to reason about the anaesthesia 
doses, but not about anything else. But what about cases in which our higher-order evidence 
is more general? What if it suggested that Anton is bad at all kinds of reasoning, including 
making educated guesses about his reliability, making educated guesses about the reliability 
of those guesses, and so on? One might worry that in a case like this, our view will require 
Anton to apply Evidential Calibration over and over again at every level, and there will be no 
stable answer as to what his rational credence in dose B should be.
 It is controversial whether “general defeat” like this is possible – that is, whether we 
can really have good reason to doubt all of our rational faculties at once.29 Supposing that it 
is, though, the phenomenon is genuinely puzzling. It’s not clear what would count as the right 
verdict in these cases; what should Anton believe when he has reason to doubt all of his 
reasoning? There seems to be no satisfactory resolution. EC, as well as any other view that 
takes higher-order evidence seriously, seems to lead to the instability mentioned above. But 
to avoid that instability, we have to either reject Desideratum 2 altogether, and say that 
rationality requires us to ignore higher-order evidence, or reject Desideratum 3 altogether, 
and adopt a Level-Splitting view. As we have argued, neither of these alternatives is 
particularly attractive.
Another possible response is to say that, in such cases, the rational requirements are 
undefined.30 This possibility is also open to us in other paradoxical cases (such as self-
ascribed anti-expertise, discussed above). Though we find this option plausible, we won’t 
defend it at length here. 
We hope that the right view will offer a solution to the problem of general defeat, or 
will at least provide an explanation for why these cases are so odd. But for now we will leave 
the problem of general defeat as a puzzle for any plausible view of higher-order evidence: 
what should we believe in these cases? Can they come about? And how are they similar to, 
and different from, more familiar situations where our higher-order evidence is more 
targetted?
29 See, for instance, Roush [2009] for skepticism about this. There is also a worry whether it’s coherent to think 
that an agent could comprehend such global doubts about her reasoning. See Wright [2004], who develops this 
worry into an anti-skeptical response.
30 Lasonen-Aarnio [forthcoming] discusses this kind of response.
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5.2 Evidential strength and Desideratum 1
Unlike the problem of general defeat, this objection targets EC specifically. We claimed that 
EC respects Desideratum 1 because it takes into account which option is favored by our first-
order evidence. This sets EC apart from Guess Calibration; as we argued above, it gives us 
the resources to explain the asymmetry between Anton, who accommodated his first-order 
evidence correctly, and Anna, who did not. But you might think that, nevertheless, EC does 
not respect Desideratum 1 as fully as it should. While EC takes the valence of our first-order 
evidence into account – whether the evidence favors P or ~P – it ignores the strength of that 
evidence.
 We can bring out this objection by looking at different possible cases like Calculation. 
Hold fixed Anton’s higher-order evidence, so his expected reliability is .6 in each case. But 
now vary how strongly Anton’s first-order evidence supports dose B: suppose it supports .7 
confidence, .8, .99... in each case, EC will give the same verdict. And this looks like a 
problem. Absent higher-order worries, it matters quite a lot whether one’s evidence for P is 
weak or strong. So it’s natural to think that this difference should also matter in cases where 
we do have higher-order evidence.
 This thought is tempting, but we think there are good reasons to resist it. Taking it 
seriously seems to lead to the view that higher-order evidence should have a systematically 
smaller effect in mathematical or logical cases, and a larger effect in inductive cases. But this 
just doesn’t seem right; the fact that the evidential support for mathematical and logical 
propositions is extremely strong does not render our beliefs in these propositions immune to 
undermining by higher-order evidence. On the contrary, the results of complex mathematical 
reasoning are just as easily undermined by doubts about one’s rationality as anything else. So 
having a high degree of evidential support for P before receiving higher-order evidence 
should not always result in higher credence in P afterwards.
Vavova [2013] criticizes a similar idea (which she calls the “Intuitive Thought”) in the 
context of peer disagreement: that the rational effect of disagreement should depend on how 
rationally highly confident one was in one’s prior opinion. She argues that, instead, the 
rational effect of disagreement should depend (in part) on how clear or messy the first-order 
evidence is. If the evidence is messy, we should expect to reason badly and be unsurprised to 
encounter disagreement; if the evidence is clear, we should expect to reason well. (Since 
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Vavova takes disagreement to be evidence of one’s own irrationality, the thought carries over 
to higher-order evidence more generally.) But then, Vavova argues, there are lots of 
counterexamples to the “Intuitive Thought”: having higher rational confidence can 
sometimes mean that higher-order evidence has more of a rational effect. That’s because in 
general, we are entitled to have higher rational confidence in P when our evidence clearly 
favors P. In these cases we do not expect to make mistakes – which means that higher-order 
evidence should be more surprising, and have more of an effect. In contrast, when the 
evidence is unclear or messy, our initial rational level of confidence will tend to be more 
tempered. In these cases we should already suspect that we might have made a rational 
mistake; so, evidence of our own unreliability will be “old news” and have a smaller effect.
All of this suggests that, as far as the relationship between evidential strength and the 
rational significance of higher-order evidence is concerned, things are more complicated than 
we might have first thought. Perhaps, then, it’s not so strange that evidential strength does not 
factor into EC in any systematic way.
But while EC does not directly take evidential strength into account, it does vindicate 
some of the intutions about how evidential strength relates to rational credence in some 
central cases. In particular, EC predicts that stronger evidence will generally go along with 
higher rational confidence. This is because, as we discussed above, stronger evidence often 
goes along with higher expected reliability: the better informed you are, the more likely you 
are to get things right. EC also explains Vavova’s observation. When the evidence is unclear, 
we should expect to make rational mistakes. Correspondingly, we should also expect to get 
things wrong more often. When the evidence is unclear, our expected reliability – even before 
encountering disagreement or other higher-order evidence – will generally be lower.
At the moment we are optimistic about EC’s prospects in answering this objection: we 
are skeptical that evidential strength should factor systematically into our account of higher-
order evidence. But it is true that, in taking evidential strength out of the picture, we end up 
with a fairly weak and attenuated understanding of Desideratum 1. We leave it as a question 
for future research whether a better compromise between the three desiderata could be 
developed; we hope that the discussion here serves to place some constraints on what such a 
view should look like, and what phenomena it should hope to explain.
5.3 The “default” problem
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The last puzzle we will consider here has to do with how to interpret expected reliability in 
the absence of higher-order concerns. What does EC say to someone who has no reason to 
suspect that she’s irrational? Earlier, we brought up this kind of case as one in which EC does 
well at explaining commonsense ideas about evidence and reliability. If your evidence 
supports P to degree .8, e.g., then absent higher-order worries you should expect your 
educated guess that P to be about 80% reliable.
 Our interpretation, however, has the consequence that someone with no evidence 
about her own reliability is treated in the same way as someone with lots and lots of evidence 
that she is perfectly reliable. This may strike you as odd; after all, these cases are very 
different. What’s going on here?
 This is an instance of a more general problem in epistemology. How it can be rational 
to use some faculty or epistemic method – memory, testimony, perception, or in this case, our 
own rationality – without knowing on independent grounds that the faculty is reliable? 
Should our rational “default” attitude be “guilty until proven innocent,” so that, in the 
absence of independent evidence that the method is reliable, we should assume that the 
method is unreliable? Should we take a neutral attitude? Or should our rational default be 
“innocent until proven guilty,” so that we take the method to be reliable unless we have 
evidence to the contrary? Problems arise for any option. If the default is either to assume that 
the method is unreliable, or to take a neutral attitude towards its reliability, we are quickly led 
to skepticism. For there will be no way to trust any method to acquire the information about 
track records that we’d need to trust that method. (No way, that is, if we assume that 
bootstrapping is not a legitimate way to gain information about a method’s track record.31) 
On the other hand, if the default is to assume that the method is reliable, we are rationally 
entitled to form beliefs about the world using that method without any evidence that it works 
– so, no evidence at all is just as good as evidence that the method is perfectly reliable.
 In spelling out the motivation for EC, we chose the last option. This is because we 
think that we can rationally form beliefs about the world, but we cannot rationally bootstrap. 
31 For an example how this issue plays out in the recent epistemology of perception: Pryor [2000] has defended 
a view on which we can trust perception while remaining neutral on whether our perceptual faculties are 
reliable. In his [2006], White argues that this leads to bootstrapping.
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In light of this, the last option is the only way to go.32 But to defend this view would require 
us to stray far from the current debate and take on the general skeptical challenge – we cannot 
do that here.
Since the “default problem” is so pervasive, we should expect it to crop up in the 
epistemology of higher-order evidence – just as it does in the epistemology of memory, 
testimony, and perception. And we should not look to our theory of higher-order evidence to 
provide a solution to the problem; rather, the solution will have to be something much more 
general. So it is no surprise that the default problem crops up for EC, and that EC cannot 
solve it. What we should expect, instead, is that our theory of higher-order evidence will 
explain how this more general issue comes into play. EC is well-suited, we think, for this 
more modest task.
 
6. Conclusion
We started by motivating three desiderata for a plausible account of higher-order evidence. 
We said that rational beliefs should reflect the bearing of (1) first-order evidence and (2) 
higher-order evidence, but that (3) one’s first-order and higher-order attitudes should not be 
in tension with one another. It seems impossible to meet all three desiderata in a 
straightforward way. But it is possible to strike a balance, and Evidential Calibration does: it 
holds us responsible for accommodating our first-order evidence correctly, while allowing us 
to be rationally uncertain about what to believe. Evidential Calibration also provides us with 
a principled account of how epistemic levels should interact: why our first-order and higher-
order attitudes should generally be aligned, and why it is sometimes problematic when they 
diverge. More generally, we hope that our discussion highlights some choice points for any 
32 White [2006] suggests the route we choose here as one option to avoid both bootstrapping and skepticism: 
“Suppose that we abandon dogmatism, and insist that in order to gain perceptual justification for believing that 
P, we must have independent justification for believing that we are not victims of a visual illusion that P. We 
could nevertheless insist that we have a kind of default justification for assuming the general reliability of our 
perceptual faculties. We are entitled to believe that our faculties tend to deliver the truth unless we have some 
positive reason to doubt this.” (p. 553)
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plausible view of higher-order evidence: the kind of trade-offs that it will have to make, and 
the phenomena that it will need to explain.33
33 This paper has benefitted greatly from helpful feedback and discussion at many earlier 
stages. We would especially like to thank Roger White, Miriam Schoenfield, and David 
Christensen. Thanks also to Adam Elga, Josh Schechter, Tom Dougherty, Alex Byrne, Dan 
Greco, Jennifer Carr, Alan Hazlett, Brian Hedden, Brendan Dill, Jack Marley-Payne, 
Bernhard Salow, Katia Vavova, Kenny Walden, and Rebecca Millsop, as well as audiences at 
the MIT Epistemology Group, the 2012 MITing of the Minds conference, the University of 
Kent, the University of Leeds, the University of Edinburgh, and the University of Cambridge. 
Special thanks to Stew Cohen for very helpful and extensive written comments on earlier 
drafts.
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